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IN THE WAKE OF SAKHALIN II:
HOW NON-GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES COULD STRENGTHEN
RUSSIA’S ENERGY SECTOR
Nowell David Beckett Bamberger†
Abstract: Russia’s economically vital oil and gas industry is at a crossroads.
Although foreign investment favored European nations in the wake of the Soviet
collapse, in recent years American and European oil and gas companies have invested
billions of dollars in Russia’s energy development and export distribution sectors.
However, the 2006 restructuring of the $20 billion Sakhalin II project demonstrates that
Russia’s energy sector has still not stabilized from the turbulent privatization of the
1990s. This comment explores the legal structures and Government policies affecting
Russia’s oil and gas industry for evidence of the causes of institutional instability. It
argues that to prevent political and business elites from continuing to manipulate the
country’s most profitable industry, Russia’s energy resources should be administered by
an independent entity, a Public Leasing Authority. By creating a new institution with
transparent motives, Russia may be able to remove the historic temptation to use
economic regulation to accomplish short-term political goals and thereby enhance the
stability of its energy sector and its larger economy.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 2006, the Russian government set off a firestorm of
international criticism when President Vladimir Putin recommended the
cancellation of permits for the controversial Sakhalin II development project
in Russia’s Far East.1 The Sakhalin Project, managed by an international
consortium including Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui, has been
developing infrastructure for the removal of Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”)
off the coast of Russia’s Sakhalin Oblast since forming in 1994.2 The
seeming collapse of the project, just short of its 2007 expected completion
date, raises new questions for foreign investors in Russia’s energy sector.
Namely, how can positive, productive, and responsible foreign investment
be encouraged?
†
The author would like to thank the staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for the
interminable attention to detail and relentless pursuit of conciseness that has made this a better comment;
Professors Sylvia Kang’ara and Veronica Taylor at the University of Washington School of Law for
editorial assistance; and Associate Professor Cheryl Beckett, Director of Legal Research and Writing at
Gonzaga University School of Law, for teaching him how to write. All errors in form or substance are the
author’s own.
1
Criticism of Sakhalin Energy not grounds for halting Sakhalin II oil and gas project, INTERFAX :
POLAND BUSINESS NEWSWIRE, September 21, 2006.
2
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Factsheet: Understanding the
Project and Process, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/factsh/themes/sakhalin.pdf.
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Like many foreign investments in Russia’s energy sector, the
Sakhalin II project was structured under a Production Sharing Agreement
(“PSA”) between the Sakhalin Energy Investment Corporation (“SEIC”) and
the government of the Russian Federation.3 Russia’s use of the PSA model
was a response to the realization that the country’s mainline economy was
too unstable to attract more traditional forms of investment in an economic
sector where profitability only follows from massive front-end capital
expenditure.4 Yet in Russia, the PSA model has failed to shield existing
investment from domestic politics and consequently failed to encourage new
international investment.
This comment will argue that the Sakhalin experience demonstrates
deficiencies in Russia’s current institutional structure for foreign energy
investment. The current structure is unsustainable in a world economy that
increasingly demands calculable risks and reliable expectations. A new
model for pairing international expertise with Russian resources is necessary
to develop a stable, predictable, and profitable domestic energy development
and exploration sector.
Part II explores the collapse5 of the Sakhalin II agreement in the wider
context of Russia’s search for foreign investment, economic and legal
stability, and international acceptance as a dominant economic power. Part
III addresses the shortcomings of the current approach to international
energy contracting under PSAs. Part IV explores the need for Russia to take
a new approach to achieve its goals for developing its energy resources
through foreign investment. Finally, Part V prescribes a new institutional
solution in response to the deficient institutions and political manipulation
that led to Sakhalin’s demise. The creation of a quasi-governmental Public
Leasing Authority, which would stand as a buffer between international
investors and the Russian government, would enable Russia to stimulate
foreign investment by insulating international firms from the substantial
risks and liabilities associated with doing business in Russia.

3

Russia says to honor PSAs, as Sakhalin energy project woes mount, RAI NOVOSTI [Russian
Information Agency], September 19, 2006.
4
Id.
5
It has been suggested that the Sakhalin II agreement did not, in fact, collapse but was rather
restructured under government pressure to create a new framework for development. When addressing
such a politically charged issue as government interference in private investment, word choice can be
determinative. It is the author’s suggestion that, while the Sakhalin II project continues (albeit in a
radically new iteration) the Sakhalin II agreement (the legal framework under which the project was
developed) did collapse of both its own insufficiency and strong government pressure.

JUNE 2007

II.

ADMINISTRATION OF RUSSIA’S ENERGY SECTOR

671

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS INDISPENSABLE TO DEVELOP RUSSIA’S
ENERGY SECTOR AND TO DRIVE RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC RESURGENCE

In the last several years Russia has profited from historically high
energy prices and an unquenchable demand for the 40% of the world’s
natural gas that underlies its enormous territory.6
The economic
independence generated by energy wealth has prompted an ambiguous
government approach to foreign investment in the energy sector. 7 Yet
mismanaging foreign investment opportunities threatens to cut off the flow
of foreign technology, expertise, and capital, which have been the drivers of
increasing production since post-Soviet privatization. In the long term,
Russia must develop stable institutions for regulating foreign energy
investment to fortify its economy against economic and energy-price
instability.
A.

In the Long Term, Russia Cannot Rely on Profitable Oil Exports to
Underpin its Economy or to Ameliorate the Problems in its Energy
Sector

In spite of very real development problems, Russia is an extractive
energy powerhouse. The territory of the modern Russian Federation boasts
the world’s eighth largest proven reserves of oil and is the world’s secondlargest oil producer after Saudi Arabia.8 It is home to the world’s largest
natural gas reserves,9 which when included in its overall production make
Russia the world’s leading hydrocarbon exporting state.10 However, even
extraordinary energy-sector performance has proven barely sufficient to
sustain the country’s oil and gas–dependent national economy.11
6
In 2004 the chairman of Shell’s Russia operations commented that “[a]ll natural-resources
companies have to go where the natural resources are . . . . Russia is by definition very important. It is
where the opportunities lie.” Tracy Boles, Special Report: Make or Break for Shell in Russia, THE TIMES
(LONDON), March 12, 2006.
7
Foreign investment, particularly in the technology-dependent oil and gas industry, has historically
undermined the development of domestic industrial capacity because foreign multinational firms tend to be
more competitive than their domestic counterparts. See Quan Li & Adam Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes:
Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2003), at 183.
8
Russia: Back to the Future? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong.
(June 29, 2006) (statement of Amy Myers Jaffe, Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies, James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/
testimony/2006/JaffeTestimony060629.pdf.
9
Tomas W. Waelde, International Energy Investment, 17 ENERGY L. J. 191, 210 (1996).
10
Russia: Back to the Future?, supra note 8.
11
Symposium, The Russian Petroleum Legislation Project at the University of Houston Law Center,
Gary B. Conine, Petroleum Licensing: Formulating an Approach for the New Russia, 15 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
317, 327-329 (1993).
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State control of energy resources is vitally important to the Russian
government.12 Russia’s $975 billion (US) (2006) national economy, the
tenth largest in the world,13 is precariously perched on a branch held by its
three largest national energy companies: privately-held OAO Lukoil14 and
state-controlled OAO Gazprom and OAO Rosneft. Of the three, Gazprom,
in which the Russian government holds a 38.37% controlling stake,15 has
shown itself to be the most aggressive in attempting to monopolize Russian
gas production.16
Russia would be in dire financial straits without a strong energy sector
for two reasons. First, Russia has not benefited from the same foreign
investment as its former communist neighbors. From 1988 through 1994
Russia’s share of Foreign Direct Investment amounted to just $3.5 billion
(US), less than half of the total investment in Hungary and six times less
than in Slovenia on a per-capita basis.17 During the same period, foreign
investors completely forewent opportunities to invest in the western-style oil
and gas concessions offered by the Russian government. Second, because
energy sales provide the only reliable source of foreign hard currency, a
rapid decline in oil and gas profits could lead to defaults on foreign
development loans, and consequently to economic collapse.18
12
It was estimated that in 2002, each dollar increase in the world market price for crude oil
generated between $1.5 and 2 billion (US) in oil export revenues for the Russian government. Clifford G.
Gaddy, Has Russia Entered a Period of Sustainable Economic Growth?, in RUSSIA AFTER THE FALL 130
(Andrew C. Kuchins, ed., 2002) Given Russia’s significant increase in oil exports since that time, the value
of high oil prices is likely even greater today.
13
World Economic Outlook Database for September 2006, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2006) (Download “By
Countries,” “All Countries” by “Gross Domestic Product, current prices (U.S. dollars)”).
14
Lukoil is the world’s second largest non-state holder of proven oil reserves. Andrew E. Kramer,
Lukoil, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/l/lukoil/
index.html (last visited Jan. 22 2006).
15
Gazprom in Figures 2002-2004, 13 (fact book prepared by the company for the 2005 OAO
Gazprom annual General shareholders meeting), available at http://www.gazprom.com/documents/
Statistika%20En.pdf.
16
Although Lukoil is the larger producer of petroleum, Gazprom’s roughly 110 billion proven
barrels of natural gas reserves, the largest in the world, gives the company, and through it the Russian
Government, a virtual monopoly on Russian natural gas production. See Laura A. Wakefield, Note, The
Need for Comprehensive Legislation in the Russian Oil and Gas Industries, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
149, 160 (1997).
17
Conine, supra note 11, at 431.
18
Daniel Kimmage, The Fog Before the War, RFE/RL BUSINESS WATCH, 5 Nov. 2002, reprinted in
JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST 6536 #16 (David Johnson, ed., 6 Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6536.cfm; Abbigail Chiodo & Michael T. Owyang, A Case Study of a
Currency Crisis: The Russian Default of 1998, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW, Vol.
84, No. 6 at 12 (2002) (explaining the root causes of Russia’s 1998 loan default and resulting economic
consequences). See also Mark A. Stoleson, Investment at an Impasse: Russia’s Production-Sharing
Agreement Law and the Continuing Barriers to Petroleum Investment in Russia, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 671, 674 (1997) (explaining the fragility of Russia’s reliance on energy to underpin its economy).
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The current regime in Moscow believes foreign capital investment to
be largely unnecessary, as it uses its foreign income from oil and gas exports
to underwrite its economic expansion.19 This economic situation, somewhat
reminiscent of the Soviet situation in the late 1980’s, is momentary at best.20
Oil prices are at historic highs.21 As Mikhail Gorbachev did in the late
1980s, President Putin has used the money from oil and gas sales to pay off
foreign debts, infuse cash into the major economic centers of Moscow and
St. Petersburg, and reinforce Russia’s economic clout on the international
stage.22 Yet, all is not as rosy as the Kremlin likes to suggest. Russia is
currently producing oil and gas at capacity, while its main competitor, Saudi
Arabia, is producing at less than two-thirds of capacity.23 Future increases in
production must therefore necessarily come from new exploration and
development. Those efforts are completely dependent on foreign expertise,
equipment, and investment.24 Gazprom lacks the resources, both technical
and managerial, to effectively develop a growing portfolio of enterprises.25

19

A Deal is a Deal, THE TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 22, 2006, at 23.
Russian energy policy has always been used as an instrument to accomplish larger political
objectives. During the main of the Soviet expansionist period, oil production rose each year, buoyed
mainly by new exploration and new production, because Soviet technology continued to lag behind that of
competing Western firms. Conine, supra note 11, at 324-25. This increasing production helped insulate
the Soviet economy from the energy shortages and economic vulnerabilities of the late 1960s and early
1970s. In the late 1980s central planners used Russia’s 440 billion (US) in oil export revenues to reinforce
the communist system, but little was reinvested in exploration, diminishing future development capacity.
C.I.S. Oil Woes Laid at Feet of Underspending for Exploration, OIL AND GAS JOURNAL 44 (May 4, 1992).
21
It was estimated that in 2002, each dollar increase in the world market price for crude oil
generated between $1.5 and 2 billion (US) in oil export revenues for the Russian government. Gaddy,
supra note 12, at 130-136.
22
Kevin O’flynn, Too Much Money, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 12, 2005 available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9191050/site/newsweek/. See also Arkady Ostrovsky, Kremlin Makes Life
Difficult on Sakhalin, FINANCIAL TIMES: FT.COM, Nov. 22, 2006, available at
www.sakhalinenergy.com/docs/media/en/194/FT_22-11-06_en_no%20map.doc (arguing that the benefits
of Sakhalin development are not being shared with the local community).
23
James Schofield, Russia’s Oil Renaissance, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, June 24, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2058214.stm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
24
Id.
25
Gazprom’s Gas Grab, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at 14. Non-development aspects of the
Russian energy industry are similarly in need of Western investment. In particular, Russia’s pipeline
infrastructure, important in times of high oil prices but critical for efficient oil and gas transport when
prices fall, is completely inadequate. Transneft, the State pipeline monopoly, has proven unable to meet
the international and domestic demand for export capacity, and the nation has begun to look to international
sources for pipeline development assistance. Bernard A. Gelb, CRS Report to Congress: Russian Oil and
Gas Challenges (RL33212), U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2006, at 3 (on file with the
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
20
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The Production Sharing Agreement Structure Has Successfully
Encouraged Investment in Developing Countries

In post-Soviet Russia, it quickly became clear that the Soviet-era laws
“On Foreign Investment”26 and “On Subsoil Resources,”27 signed in 1990
and 1992 respectively, provided insufficient guarantees against political and
economic uncertainty to attract foreign investors.28 As Russia evolved from
a command economy to a capitalist economy, the most formidable challenge
to foreign investors was the risk of unforeseeable legislative changes.29 In
response to a lack of foreign investment in oil and gas, President Yeltsin
signed a decree “on Production Sharing Agreements for the Use of
Underground Resources” in late 1993.30 Lacking statutory credibility
because the State Duma refused to ratify the Decree, this initial framework
was not successful in attracting favorable foreign investment.31 Some
agreements, like the Sakhalin II Agreement, were concluded, although on
internationally non-standard terms that tended to strongly advantage the
foreign party.
The use of PSAs is a relatively straightforward way of allocating the
political and economic risks inherent in foreign oil exploration. They were
first introduced as a vehicle for foreign investment in energy exploration by
Indonesia in 196632 which, at that time, was responding to many of the same
problems that Russia currently faces.33 The principle characteristics that
make the PSA structure acceptable to both an autocratic regime and foreign
investors are: 1) continued state-ownership of the underlying natural
resource (rather than concession to a foreign entity), 2) a self-contained
26
Decree of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Foreign Investments in the
USSR (Oct. 26, 1990).
27
Federal Law No. 2395-1 on Subsoil Resources (Feb. 21, 1992).
28
PAUL CHAISTY, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC POWER IN RUSSIA 175 (2006).
29
Yuri Petrov, former director of the State Investment Corporation (SIC) was quoted in 1993
commenting that “change in legislation is the biggest risk facing potential investors [in Russia]”. Stoleson,
supra note 18, at 679.
30
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Production Sharing Agreements gor The Use
of Underground Resources, No. 2285 (Dec. 24, 1993). This decree was invalidated by later executive
action. See Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Invalidating Decree No. 2285, No. 1275
(Aug. 28 1996).
31
Stoleson, supra note 18, at 675.
32
The Indonesian Government nationalized foreign-owned property during the early 1960s, and
offered foreign oil companies an alternative to the ordinary oil concession: a new self-contained agreement
whereby foreign firms could extract oil from State-owned fields in exchange for a percentage of the
developed oil. See David N. Smith & Louis T. Wells, Jr., Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries:
Structures and Substance, AM. J. OF INT’L L., Vol. 69, No. 3, 560, 586 (1975).
33
Kristen Bindemann, Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis 1 (1999) (on file
with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
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agreement, entirely insulated from the domestic regulatory regime, and
ostensibly guaranteed against further state expropriation, and 3) payment to
the host regime in crude oil, rather than currency, providing both a guarantee
against under-pricing of oil in sale by the development company to its
foreign affiliates34 and State access to a strategic resource.
Under a typical agreement, the host country bears the risk of political
instability35 while the foreign investor shoulders the entire exploration risk.36
The inclusion of all relevant terms within the four corners of the agreement
insulates the foreign investor from changes to the domestic regulatory or
legal environment.37 At the same time, the foreign investor must front the
entire cost of exploration, yet receives no compensation if no oil is found.38
PSAs are typically signed for a fixed period and disputes are typically
assigned to the jurisdiction of an international arbitral forum rather than the
national courts of the host country.39
Unlike ordinary mineral concessions, the State only profits under a
PSA if resources are actually recovered. After exploration is complete and
development begins, the “production-sharing” element of the agreements
kicks in. The oil found is first divided into “cost oil” and “profit oil.”40 The
former is retained by the foreign investor to recoup the cost of development.
In this way, the foreign investor (or, more correctly, its creditors) is paid
first.41 The remaining profit oil is then divided between the host country and
the foreign investor according to a predetermined proportion with the
government virtually always receiving a greater percentage of the profit
oil.42 Finally, according to the terms of the agreement, the foreign investor
typically pays taxes on its operations, including export, income, and profit
repatriation taxes.43 The taxes are paid in hard currency, in contrast to the
share of production, which is provided in oil or gas.44 It is important to note
that these are the elements of a typical agreement, and many countries have
introduced additional elements, such as royalty payments and caps on cost
34

See Smith & Wells, supra note 32, at 587.
Bindemann, supra note 33, at 1.
36
Id.
37
Stoleson, supra note 18, at 682.
38
Id.
39
Ian Rutledge, The Sakhalin II PSA – A Production ‘Non-Sharing’ Agreement, Analysis of Revenue
Distribution, Sheffield Energy & Resources Information Services, November 2004, at 13 (on file with the
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
40
Id.
41
See id at 14.
42
Id. at 13.
43
Stoleson, supra note 18, at 678.
44
Smith & Wells, supra note 32, at 587.
35
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recovery, that alter the financial relationship slightly but leave the allocation
of risk intact.45
III.

RUSSIA’S AD-HOC PSA STRUCTURE HAS UNDERMINED EFFORTS
COURT STABLE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

TO

In a country of unorthodox investments, the Sakhalin II Production
Sharing Agreement is truly outstanding. The idea of international
development of the Sakhalin Project46 began during the late Soviet period.
In 1991 the Soviet Ministry of Oil and Gas was approached by Marathon
Petroleum, MacDermott International Investment, and Mitsui and Co. about
the prospects for development of explored gas reserves off the coast of
Sakhalin Island.47 The successor Yeltsin government signed a PSA
formalizing the agreement on June 22, 1994, without legislative approval.48
By the time that the PSA legislation was passed, Royal Dutch Shell had
become the majority stakeholder and the Sakhalin project was well
underway.49
A.

The Non-Standard Profit Structure of Sakhalin II Provided Financial
Incentives for Government Manipulation

The Sakhalin II PSA is extraordinarily non-standard in both process
and substance. From a procedural perspective, it was enacted prior to
45

See generally Bindemann, supra note 33, at 13.
The Sakhalin II Project is actually a number of infrastructure improvement and development
projects necessary to develop the Astokhskoye and Lunskoye natural gas fields off the coast of Sakhalin
Island, just north of Japan. The most important improvements are the construction of off-shore oil rigs, an
export terminal for Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”) at the town of Korsakov on the southern tip of
Sakhalin, and many miles of undersea and overland pipeline to connect them. Also necessary are
improvements to area roads, electricity infrastructure, the resettlement of those people and businesses that
will be displaced by the development, and the mitigation of extensive environmental impacts. EUROPEAN
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 1.
47
Report of the Auditing Chamber of the Russian Federation in response to Decision of the State
Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation No. 3994-P GD (May 20, 1999) [hereinafter
“Auditing Chamber Report”] § 2.1 (Decision No. 39994-P GD authorized the State Auditing Chamber to
audit both the Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II Production Sharing Agreements, including the activities of the
parties (including the Russian Federation government) under those agreements).
48
Id. at § 2.11.
49
Controversially, the first phase of the development was backed by a 116 Million (US) loan from
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”). EBRD Delays Financing of Sakhalin2 Second Stage, THE RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS REPORT NO., Nov. 15, 2006, at 116. The EBRD, an institution
created to support private enterprise in ex-Soviet countries struggles under a split mandate of profitable yet
socially responsible investment. In the wake of the Gazprom restructuring, the international financier
concluded “it is not feasible for the EBRD to pursue the current project.” Clare Watson, EBRD Withdraws
Support for Sakhalin II Project, ENERGY BUSINESS REVIEW, Jan. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.energy-business-review.com/article_news.asp?guid=6FC97F09-6BFC-4AEC-B76C-12EED52
8DCF8. As of publication, this remains the Bank’s official position.
46
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legislative authorization of PSAs. A 1999 audit by the State Duma
determined that because the authorization process was not standardized
“insufficient measures were taken in the interests of the State on questions of
ecology, resource use, tax and customs legislation, and state control . . . ”50
The Duma concluded that by entering into a contract without competitive
bidding, the agreement violated Russian Federation Law No. 2395-1 “On
Resources.”51 However, a “grandfather” clause in the 1995 legislation “On
Production Sharing Agreements” gave Sakhalin II ex post facto validity and
made it enforceable.52
Also unusual is that the Sakhalin II agreement guarantees a profit for
SEIC, the foreign investor. Typically, the investor bears both the risk that no
oil will be discovered and the risk that the oil discovered will not be
sufficient to cover costs, including payments to the host country.53 For
Sakhalin II, however, there was no exploration risk. Prior exploration by the
Russian Government and Russian companies had already revealed 96 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas reserves.54 In addition to ameliorating exploration
risk, the PSA’s peculiar revenue structuring scheme removed any risk that
development itself would be prohibitively expensive. Under the PSA, SEIC
would retain all initial proceeds from development, until the capital
investment was recovered and a 17.5% rate of return was realized.55 With a
capital investment projected at $20 billion (US), the PSA assured SEIC a
minimum $3.75 billion (US) profit. The Russian Federation would have
begun to share in revenue only after SEIC recovered its initial investment
and profit.56 For the first two years thereafter, the Russian government
would have received 10% of the gas, while SEIC was to retain 90%. After
that two-year period, the Russian government was to receive 50% of the gas
until SEIC realized a 24% internal rate of return on its initial investment.

50

Auditing Chamber Report, supra note 47, at § 3.2.
Id. at § 3.4.
52
Id. at § 3.1.
53
Bindemann, supra note 33, at 1.
54
Sakhalin Island, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS,
Sakhalin Island, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sakhalin/Background.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
55
Rutledge, supra note 39, at 15.
56
To be fair, the Russian government does receive money as a result of the project during the whole
of the development process from its taxes on corporate profits, extraction, profit repatriation, and the valueadded tax. These, however, are taxes recovered on all commercial activity within the Russian Federation
and should be distinguished from the profits which are to be expected when the State gratuitously provides
the commodity underlying the commercial activity. Under a lease/concession system, the host government
also recovers taxes in addition to royalty payments. The Production Sharing Agreement is designed to
substitute production sharing for royalty payments.
51
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Only then would the Russian government begin to recover its permanent
70% share of production.57
The problem inherent with this particular agreement is that the risk
was entirely allocated to the State, providing the foreign investors with little
incentive to guarantee a profitable enterprise. Because initial investments
were to be deducted dollar for dollar from initial production, the money
spent on exploration came from the State share of production, providing
little incentive for SEIC (which was guaranteed a minimum 24% return) to
limit expenses.58
B.

Although the Government Claims that Privatization of Russian
Industry Has Ended, Economic Instability Remains

The collapse of the Sakhalin II PSA illustrates the problem with longterm investment in the Russian Federation’s energy sector: massive
investments in an economic sector that attracts such strong government
scrutiny continue to be subject to government manipulation even after
privatization has nominally been concluded.59 Since the early 1990s and to
this day, the Kremlin has demonstrated that it is willing to follow the
politically-expedient course of economic intervention to secure short-term
profits at the expense of long-term stability.
The trend first emerged in the energy context when, in 1993, U.S.based Amoco became the single largest foreign investor in Russia by
purchasing a 50% stake in development at the Priobskoye oil field, the
largest undeveloped oil field in Russia.60 The partner in the deal was
Russia’s leading oil producer at the time: OAO Yukos. All went well until

57

Rutledge, supra note 39, at 15.
Id.
For more information about Russia’s turbulent post-Soviet privatization process, see Maxim
Boyceko, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. VishnyVichney, Stanley Fischer & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Privatizing
Russia, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, Vol. 1993, No. 2 at 140 (1993). The true cost of
privatization during the 1990s is just now becoming apparent. It is manifest in a real and apparent rift in
the fabric of Russian society, a consequence of the upset of the Soviet social contract that guaranteed all
citizens a minimal level of subsistence. Judyth L. Twigg, What has Happened to Russian Society? in
RUSSIA AFTER THE FALL 148 (Andrew C. Kuchins, ed., 2002). With the concentration of wealth that
followed on post-Soviet privatization, by 1997 1.5% of the population controlled 65% of the private
national wealth. The rampant inflation that precipitated the devaluation of the Ruble caused nominal
incomes and pensions to shrink as well, to 46% and 56% of their pre-collapse values respectively by 1996.
STEPHEN WHITE, RUSSIA’S NEW POLITICS 145 (2000). For many Russians, the promise of capitalism has
been a lie: only one in six Russian families is better off today than they were in 1992. Twigg, supra note
59, at 149.
60
Paul Klebnikov, Russian Roulette, FORBES, April 20, 1998, at 136.
58
59
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Yukos was acquired in 1995 by Menatep Bank.61 Menatep’s principle
shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, recognized an opportunity to take
advantage of Amoco’s initial $300 million (US) exploration investment and
the significant expertise that had already been transferred to Yukos.62
Setting aside previous arrangements, Yukos offered to renegotiate the deal,
giving itself a greater stake in production and requiring Amoco to make a
significantly greater investment.63
Although there was a previous
agreement, Yukos subsidiary Yuganskneftegaz64 held the government lease
to the Priobskoye field,65 and Amoco was ultimately forced to write off its
investment.66
What is particularly disturbing for the foreign energy investor is the
extent to which this pattern, first seen in the private sector,67 has been
adopted by the government68 and used to force the restructuring of more
critical national investment projects even after the national privatization
process has supposedly ended.69 This strong-arm approach to regulation is
an eerie apparition of Russia’s reposed Soviet central administration.70
61

Lee S. Wolosky, Putin’s Plutocrat Problem, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 18. Yukos was
acquired by Menatep Bank, controlled by now-infamous oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 1995 under a
very complicated and highly suspect structured transaction. Because the Russian government relied on the
banking infrastructure to manage auctions of State property, registered banks were not permitted to bid in
the auctions. Ira W. Lieberman & Rogi Veimetra, The Rush for State Shares in the “Klondyke” of Wild
East Capitalism: Loans-For-Shares Transactions in Russia, 29 GW J. INT’L L. & ECON. 737, 750 (1996).
Yet, by establishing wholly-owned front companies to enter bids, Menatep was able to acquire Yukos for
the staggeringly low price of $300 million (US). Before being liquidated by the Russian Government in
2003, Yukos was valued at $15 billion (US). Marshall I. Goldman, The Oligarchs Overstep Their Bounds,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2003, reprinted in CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY, 267, #8 Aug. 1, 2003),
http://www.cdi.org/russia/267-8.cfm.
62
Paul Klebnikov, The Oligarch Who Came in from the Cold, FORBES, Mar. 18, 2002.
63
Wolosky, supra note 61, at 18.
64
Yukos: Exploration and Production, Priobskoye Oil Field, Yukos corporate website,
http://www.yukos.com/EP/Priobskoe_Oil_Field.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
65
Erik Kreil, Oil and Gas Joint Ventures in the Former Soviet Union, report for the U.S. Department
of Energy, Aug. 1996 (on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
66
Klebnikov, supra note 60.
67
In other industries, examples such as Minutka Limited’s 1994 expropriation of a St. Petersburg
Subway sandwich shop illustrate the pattern. During the 1990s it was particularly common for foreign
partners to visit Russia only to find that their investments no longer existed. See Ethan S. Burger, Russian
Legislation on Enforcement of Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, in A LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN
RUSSIA AND THE FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R. 91 (Aviva Yakren, ed. 2000) (citing A. Belousov,
EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN’ (No. 33, August 1997)).
68
To some observers it may seem that the Russian Government has taken the place of the Russian
oligarchs, like Yukos’ Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who took an exceedingly cynical approach to the
accumulation of economic influence. See Klebnikov, supra note 62 (referencing Khodorkovsky’s defense
of the lawlessness of the 1990s).
69
The pattern of expropriation is quite explicit. First, foreign joint investment with a Russian
company is encouraged. The foreign investor brings hard currency and world-class expertise. Second,
there is a transfer of expertise to the Russian partner. The Russian partner becomes increasingly competent
in the industry, eventually believing its own expertise to be equal to that of the foreign investor. Third,
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From the beginning, Sakhalin II was a potential target for State action
because it was not a joint venture; all of the partners were foreign.71
Russia’s state gas monopoly was understandably hesitant about the prospect
of a giant foreign competitor in the gas exporting business. In July 2005
Gazprom approached SEIC and offered a swap: in exchange for a 25% plus
one share stake in Sakhalin II, Gazprom offered Shell a 50% stake in
Gazprom’s Zapolyarnoye-Neocomian field.72
A few days later, SEIC announced a significant cost overrun and
significant development delays for the Sakhalin II project.73 The overall
costs for development were doubled from $10 billion (US), to just over $20
billion (US), a cost increase slated to significantly put off when the Russian
Government could share in production.74 Then, on September 18, 2006, the
Russian government decided that the project had become undesirable, and
began the process of removing foreign investors from the Sakhalin equation.
Citing environmental concerns that had been raised by NGOs years earlier,75
but about which nothing had previously been done, the Ministry of Natural
Resources revoked key environmental permits, bringing the project to a
halt.76
some roadblock is created to the project. The books might by cooked to show an unprofitable enterprise, or
needed land or commodities might become unavailable, or government permits might be withheld. Fourth,
the Russian company offers to purchase the foreign-held shares at severely sub-market prices. The foreign
investor, faced with no other option, typically accepts this offer. In many cases, the offer is not even
necessary. The foreign investor simply takes a loss on the enterprise and leaves the Russian market. See
Burger, supra note 67, at 92.
70
As one pro-Kremlin journalist explains, “Vladimir Putin slowly but steadily centralized the key
branches of the economy.” Vladimir Shlapentokh, Intoxicated by High Oil Prices: Political Dutch Disease
Afflicting the Kremlin, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Nov. 6, 2006, at 18. An anonymous American investor adds,
“[State-controlled] Gazprom thinks of itself as the Ministry of Gas. Its partners are supposed to shut up and
do as they are told.” Klebnikov, supra note 60.
71
Klebnikov, supra note 60.
72
Because of the structure of the deal, with Shell reducing its Sakhalin holdings substantially,
Gazprom was poised to become the lead shareholder in the project. Gazprom to pay cash for Sakhalin-2,
RosBusinessConsulting (Russia), http://top.rbc.ru/english/index.shtml?/news/english/2006/12/20/20145537
_bod.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
73
Andrew E. Kramer, Kremlin Revokes Oil Project Approval, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 19,
2006, at 1.
74
Minister Orders Report on Sakhalin II Eco-damage, Operator admits Admits Guilt, RIA NOVOSTI,
Oct. 25, 2006. In the face of these costs, state-controlled Gazprom attempted to renegotiate its former
understanding with Shell, asking that Shell’s regasification assets in North America be included in the
exchange. Shell refused, ending the Russian Government’s hopes to participate as a partner in the Sakhalin
project. Suzanne McElligott, Russia Pulls Permits on Nearly Complete Sakhalin LNG Project,
GASIFICATION NEWS, Oct. 15, 2006, Vol. IX, No. 10.
75
Statement of Common Demands by Environmental NGOs Regarding the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin2 Oil and Gas Projects, reprinted by Pacific Environment, Jan. 4, 2003, http://www.pacificenvironment.org/
article.php?id=258.
76
A Funny Shade of Green, THE ECONOMIST, September. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=7939167.
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This was no Russian environmental epiphany. When asked about the
future of other environmentally questionable oil production projects in the
country, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov tipped his hand,
commenting “I do not think accords concluded on the basis of productionsharing agreements should be revised. Production-sharing begins once costs
have been recovered. But permanently increasing expenses impose onerous
terms.”77 Russian Minister of Trade and Economic Development German
Gref agreed that the main factor prompting government action was the rising
cost of development.78 With significant foreign investments in jeopardy, the
Russian government ratcheted up the pressure, threatening criminal
prosecutions for environmental non-compliance.79
With no choice and with the memory of Amoco’s complete loss in
mind, Shell finally concluded that some cost recovery from Sakhalin II was
preferable to a total loss. On December 11, 2006, Shell offered a controlling
stake in the project to Gazprom.80 On December 21, 2006, Gazprom
acquired a 50% plus one share stake in SEIC, with Shell retaining a 27.5%
stake, Mitsui holding 12.5%, and Mitsubishi 10%.81 The real beneficiary of
the new accord was the Russian government, which will continue to collect
tax revenues on the Sakhalin project, and, as the principle shareholder in
Gazprom, also stands to increase its share of cost recovery from 0% to just
over 19% during the initial recovery period.82

77

Existing PSA Agreements Will Remain in Force – Vice Premier, RIA NOVOSTI, Oct. 24, 2006.
Ostrovsky, supra note 22.
79
Prosecutors May Launch Criminal Case Against Sakhalin II, RAI NOVOSTI, Oct. 27, 2006. At the
same time, the same bureaucratic infighting that shaped the 1995 legislation “On Production Sharing
Agreements” was again working to reshape governmental influence over the energy sector. In midOctober, officials of Russia’s law enforcement department, the Interior Ministry, searched the Ministry of
Natural Resources offices of the officials responsible for the cancellation of the Sakhalin II permits.
Martyn Wingrove, Russia Police raid environmental Raid Environmental Agency, LLOYD’S LIST
INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 19, 2006.
80
Douglas Busvine, Shell Offers Control of Sakhalin-2 to Gazprom, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlebusiness.aspx?type=tnbusinessnews&storyID=nL11674060.
81
Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui, Mitsubishi Sign Sakhalin II Protocol, SHELL NEWS & MEDIA RELEASES,
Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=media-en&FC2=&FC3=/media-en/html/
iwgen/news_and_library/press_releases/2006/sakhalin_protocol_21122006.html.
82
While the status of SEIC’s up-front investment in Sakhalin II is presently unknown, it is likely that
foreign investors will either have to write off half of that investment, or increase the period during which
they can expect its recovery, diminishing the project’s ultimate profitability. Foreign firms are likely to
think twice before committing resources on the scale of Sakhalin II where profitability and cost recovery
are not assured.
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The Post-Soviet Legislative Reform of the 1990s Was Flawed and
Continues to Hamper Efforts to Attract and Secure Foreign
Investment

The current legal framework for PSA contracting came into existence
on December 19, 1995 when President Yeltsin signed a compromise version
of legislation “On Production Sharing Agreements.”83 The passage of a
comprehensive statutory framework for PSAs is a relatively unusual feature
of the Russian experience.84 The law was widely seen as an interim
measure, and further amendment was expected.85 Although it provided a
general framework, the details of individual agreements were left to be
negotiated on a case-by-case basis by Federal and regional authorities.86
A major revision in 199887 centralized the contracting process and
removed regional control over project administration. The Ministry of
Energy,88 expecting to gain significant power from its new role as the agency
authorized to negotiate PSAs, supported these amendments.89 Meanwhile,
the Communist Party, drawing much of its support from the former Soviet
administrators who still controlled regional governments,90 joined with the
Ministry of Natural Resources and finance, customs, and tax authorities to
oppose the legislation. Because of political posturing,91 Russia’s PSA
regime is not representative of a national consensus or established policy,
83

Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004.
Samir Z. Gasimov, Pre-Legislative Formation of Petroleum Agreements in Azerbaijan in
Comparison to Legislative Framework in Russia: Legal, Economic and Political Implications 37 (2004)
(LL.M. Thesis, University of Washington School of Law).
85
CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 176.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 188.
88
The Ministry of Energy had introduced and strongly lobbied for its own version of Production
Sharing legislation in 1995, naturally granting primary contracting authority to itself. In yet another intragovernmental turf battle, the State Duma elected to pass its own version of the legislation, granting the
legislative branch greater authority over the agreements. After a veto of the initial legislation by the
Federation Council (the upper house of Russia’s Parliament), the compromise 1995 legislation was
adopted, leaving much of the detail to federal and regional executives. Stoleson, supra note 18, at 679-682.
89
CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 180.
90
The original 1995 legislation followed a compromise “two-key” model of decision-making. With
a relatively weak central Government after the Soviet collapse, the Kremlin was required to court the
support of regional powerbrokers to accomplish anything, especially in the outlying territories of Russia’s
far east. Thus, under the 1995 regulatory model, the Kremlin had to seek the support of regional
government leaders before concluding new Production Sharing Agreements. This requirement was excised
from the 1998 amendments, undercutting the politically influential members of the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (CPRF) and costing the bill Communist support. Id. at 184.
91
Paul Chaisty’s superb analysis of the factionalism of 1990s Russian lawmaking indicates that
Russia’s pro-reform Yabloko party enjoyed a consistently higher cohesion rate on PSA legislation, as the
legislation was much less a source of internal disharmony within the pro-reform Yabloko party than within
other factions. See CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 179 (Table 7.2).
84
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but rather a snapshot of the relative strength of a particular political faction
during the volatile period from 1995 through 1998. As a result, the
legislation specifically disadvantages those groups that were politically weak
in the 1990s, such as regional governments, creating incentives for those
groups to undermine the resulting agreements in which they have no vested
interest.
As a result of a haphazard legal framework, Russian PSAs are a
legislative splitting of a contractual baby. Fundamentally, the agreements
are based on the Civil Law of the Russian Federation.92 While they are to
“provide for all necessary terms and conditions related to the use of
subsoil,”93 many elements of the development relationship, such as land use
and natural resources management, remain subject to the law of the Russian
Federation.94 Thus, Production Sharing Agreements with the Russian
Government are not the sort of “self-contained” contracts found elsewhere.95
While in other countries the PSA structure is the “preferred form of foreign
investment,”96 in Russia only mineral deposits that cannot be licensed under
a traditional concession are eligible for development under a PSA.97 Finally,
Russian PSAs are not entered into for a fixed term. The term of exploration
may be extended at the discretion of the foreign investor, provided that the
project is in compliance with the agreement.98
Particularly peculiar to the Russian experience, the government is
authorized to make available no greater than 30% of known mineral reserves
under a PSA scheme.99 Because of this requirement, much of the initial
prospecting and exploration is done at State expense. In recognition of this,
the PSA legislation provides that the foreign investor must reimburse the
State for the costs of surveys and geological subsoil information associated
with the particular project.100 This seems to be a mechanism for the foreign
investor to “buy down” the initial exploration costs, but fails because foreign
investors are not likely to pay the exploration costs associated with

92

Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004,
art. 1 § 3.
93
Id. art. 2 § 1.
94
Id. art. 1 § 2.
95
Stoleson, supra note 18, at 683 (“ . . . any contract formed pursuant to PSA law will be shackled to
the same problems foreign investors face under the current legislative environment.”).
96
Smith & Wells, supra note 32, at 586.
97
Gasimov, supra note 84, at 42.
98
Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004,
art. 5 § 2.
99
Id. art. 2 § 3.
100
Id. art. 13 § 2.
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geographic regions found not to contain oil or gas deposits. Thus, the risk of
non-discovery is entirely allocated to the State.101
Without apparent justification, and further complicating an already
non-standard agreement, the drafters abandoned the ordinary principle that
the agreement itself preempts conflicting national law. Instead, the PSA
statute provides that changes to domestic law that materially impact the
agreement should result in the mandatory amendment of the agreement “to
ensure that the investor obtains the commercial results which he could have
obtained” if the legislation had not changed.102 Consistent with its lack of
specificity, the statute leaves to the parties the definition of a process for
making such a radical change, potentially making the agreement very
unstable.103
A decade after Russia’s legislative framework for the creation of PSAs
was adopted, all of the debate surrounding that legislation seems to have
been for naught. Since 1995, not a single PSA has been signed in Russia
under that statutory scheme.104 Those few PSAs negotiated prior to the
enactment of the legislation, including Sakhalin II, remain subject to the
provisions of the law but are themselves of questionable legal status.105
Ultimately Russia’s failure to use PSAs as a way to encourage foreign
energy investment—where so many less stable countries have
succeeded106—is a cautionary tale for future investors and a prescription for
institutional change to encourage healthy market activity.
D.

Russia’s Expropriation of the Sakhalin II Investment Has Broader
Ramifications for Future Investment and International Trade

The true test of Russia’s approach to foreign investment regulation,
for which no empirical predictive formula can be applied, is Sakhalin II’s
impact on new investment and international trade,107 rather than its impact
101
See, Rutledge, supra note 39, at 15 (“Since both the PA and Lunskoye fields had already been
discovered by Russian companies, the [Sakhalin Energy Consortium] did not need to worry about the
existence of in situ oil and gas. So the initial element of risk was removed from the outset.”).
102
Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004,
art. 17 § 2.
103
Art. 17 § 2 foresees changes in the legislative framework not only of the Russian Federation, but
also statutory changes enacted by subdivisions and local self-government bodies. Although untested, this
seems to suggest that a complete renegotiation of an agreement with the national government can be forced
by legislative action at the regional or even municipal level—a strange sort of inverse preemption.
104
CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 192.
105
Auditing Chamber Report, supra note 47, at § 3.1.
106
For an in-depth analysis of the successful implementation of Production Sharing Agreements in
Indonesia, Angola, Azerbaijan, India, Iran, and Peru, see Bindemann, supra note 33, at 67-82.
107
Once upon a time foreign investors in Russia were willing to write off losses due to political
maneuvering and instability. Investments were comparatively small, profits (when realized) were
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on existing projects and ventures. 108 As of 2007, Russia is fast exhausting
the pool of potential foreign firms with adequate expertise that have not
already lost significant previous investment in Russia. Investment is only
practical where the risk associated with doing business is adequately
represented in the expected rate of return.109 Sakhalin II’s collapse
demonstrates to the international community that the Russian government is
willing to play politics with some of the largest and most influential multinational companies providing the largest source of foreign income in the
country. Foreign firms are likely to reach the reasonable conclusion that if
Russia’s highest-profile foreign investment is not secure, the bureaucracy
might also take action that would destabilize smaller and less noteworthy
projects.
In addition to energy-sector instability, Russia’s pending WTO
application110 provides a pressing macro-political reason for the country to
not alienate foreign investors. Russia’s long term economic interests
demand WTO membership to promote market diversification.111 With raw
materials comprising an ever decreasing percentage of Russia’s exports, the
nation’s industries are growing increasingly sensitive to anti-dumping and
countervailing tariff penalties imposed by developed countries against
Russia’s exports, penalties that would be illegal under the WTO
framework.112 The World Bank estimates that the overall impact of WTO

enormous, and many Russian firms could be pressured into compliance with international contract
enforcement by the prospect of limited access to foreign markets. This period of somewhat fringe
investment in Russia is over. The sheer magnitude of the agreements entered into dictate their importance.
Burger, supra note 67, at 92.
108
Some have suggested that Shell’s choice to remain in a minority position within SEIC highlights
the fact that large energy companies will continue to invest in Russia, including risk as a cost of doing
business. This misses the point entirely. Sakhalin II is a legacy project: it was begun prior to the
enactment of the current investment regime and was virtually entirely developed by Shell and its partners
prior to government meddling. Shell’s choice in December of 2006 was between taking a partial loss on its
up-front investment and taking a total loss approaching $20 billion (US). Given this circumstance, it is
understandable that this company would elect to remain in the Russian market, if only to mitigate what it
could of its development costs.
109
See SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE 37
(2001).
110
On the Current State of Russia’s WTO Accession Negotiations, Ministry for Economic
Development, http://www.wto.ru/russia.asp?f=dela&t=11 (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
111
It is estimated that WTO membership will increase bilateral trade between Russia and its largest
trading partner, the European Union, from $187 billion (US) (2005) to $352 billion (US). Russia’s WTO
Accession, Hearing before the European Parliament Committee on Int’l Trade (Nov. 21, 2006) (testimony
ofAnders Âslund, Peterson Institute) available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?
ResearchID=686.
112
Id.
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accession on the Russian economy is between 3.3% and 11% of GDP.113
Yet, Russia’s unstable and often corrupt economic regulatory system
threatens to short-circuit ongoing accession negotiations. Additionally, a
collapse of massive foreign investments in the highly-visible energy sector is
likely to give support to those countries that oppose Russian membership.114
IV.

RUSSIA NEEDS A NEW MODEL FOR INVESTMENT
FOREIGN FIRMS TO INITIATE NEW ENERGY PROJECTS

TO

ENCOURAGE

Russia needs foreign investment as much as the world market needs
Russian natural resources. Particularly troublesome, both the Russian
government and Russia’s burgeoning capitalist class have demonstrated that
they are unsuitable partners for foreign firms wishing to make significant
investments in the Russian economy. Both Russian and foreign actors have
begun to look outside of the formal legal framework to fashion a system of
economic interaction that suits the particular purpose of each. The ultimate
problem is that the participants in this system are playing by a different set
of rules. Because foreign laws and international expectations prevent
foreign firms from playing by Russian rules, the Russian government must
erect institutions that will ensure that both it and its domestic companies act
in accord with international standards and expectations.
The burdens of Russian instability fall disproportionately on foreign
investors. Compared with Russian firms, foreign investors find themselves
in a regulatory and public relations straightjacket. Actions that come
without consequences for domestic investors in Russia often either violate
the corporate regulations of the country where a foreign firm is incorporated,
or would lead to damaging public relations problems with more squeamish
foreign constituencies. For companies incorporated in the United States, the
long reach of Federal extraterritorial jurisdiction statutes provide remedies
for violation of U.S. law that are not available against Russian companies

113

Jesper Jensen, Thomas Rutherford, & David Tarr, Economy-Wide and Sector Effects of Russia’s
Accession to the WTO, WORLD BANK, 2004, at 3, available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu
/resources/download/1735.pdf.
114
See Edward Gresser, A view from Outside: Russia And the Case For the WTO, RUSSIANAMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,-RUSSIAN COMMERCE NEWS (2003), available at
http://www.russianamericanchamber.org/newsletter/aviewfromthe.html (“Less well known, and especially
relevant in considering the WTO accession, are microeconomic and regulatory troubles. Ministries, finding
revenue uncertain and inexperienced with new roles as regulators rather than producers of goods, issue vast
numbers of unnecessary regulations and license requirements simply to raise money. This fosters
corruption among big businesses and officials, and plagues less-connected small-scale Russian
entrepreneurs and foreign businesses with long approval processes, unnecessary fees, and occasional
absurdities.”).
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engaged in the same activity.115 Fraud schemes erected by corporations that
do business in the United States are particularly likely to elicit U.S.
enforcement action regardless of where the firm is incorporated.116 This is
because fraud tends to transcend international boundaries, especially within
vertically-integrated multinational firms, and tends to have a domestic
impact regardless of where committed.117 To avoid foreign jurisdiction,
many Russian oil and gas companies prefer to operate through smaller
subsidiary companies with no foreign assets, shielding the parent from
foreign judgments through the unusually strong corporate veil associated
with a Russian Joint Stock Company (“JSC”).118 When the Russian
Federation Government enters the marketplace, either directly or through
subsidiaries, the doctrine of sovereign immunity restricts enforcement to a
significant degree.119
Foreign investors will only continue to invest in Russia’s energy
sector if they can be assured that they and their domestic partners will be
playing by the same set of rules within a defined and predictable legal
environment. Regulation must be freed from the control of the treacherous
115

Particularly applicable, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2,
78dd-3 (1998), prohibits companies and officers of companies governed by U.S. securities regulations from
financial dealings intended to bribe or otherwise influence foreign government officials or political
candidates. Such financial dealings are common practice, especially within the lower levels of the Russian
regional bureaucracy. Although there have been no U.S. prosecutions for Russian FCPA violations as of
publication, the U.S. Justice Department recently has become aggressive in investigating FCPA allegations
and forcing criminal penalties. See United States v. Titan Corp, 05 CR 0314-BEN (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005)
(imposing a $13 million (US) criminal fine on top of substantial profit disgorgments for a $2 million (US)
contribution to the re-election campaign of Beninan President Mathieu Kerekou). In addition, the Lanham
TradeMark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064, allows suits in U.S. Federal court to enforce trademarks infringed
abroad, a mechanism only practically applicable to international firms with assets in the United States. See
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952). Under 18 U.S.C § 1513(d), Americans who
conspire to kill or harm witnesses or participants in official proceedings are subject to criminal prosecution
in the United States regardless of where the offense was committed. In extreme cases, the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides domestic jurisdiction over any “civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” again limited by the
caveat that recovery is only likely against entities with significant assets in the United States.
116
See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 A.J.I.L. 280, 298 (1982).
117
See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-§78hh, to have extraterritorial application.).
118
Unlike in the United States, the inviolability of a Russian JSC corporate veil is based not on a
balancing of factors, but on a set of affirmative and clearly-defined corporate actions that create parent
liability. In the absence of these actions (which include commingling funds, management structures, and
directorships) there is no basis for parent liability for subsidiary actions. See KENNETH A. CUTSHAW &
IGOR D. ARKHIPOV, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA 43.002 (West 2000).
119
See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (discussing the policy reasons
underlying the doctrine). See also Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (declining
to differentiate between the commercial and military activities of a foreign state in extension of sovereign
immunity to prevent the arrest of a sovereign’s vessel for purposes of in rem jurisdiction).
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State bureaucracy,120 agreements must be given meaning through predictable
and functional enforcement, and investment must be secured against
unofficial expropriation through economic manipulation. However, for such
a framework to have credibility with Russian constituencies, it must assure
that Russia retains meaningful control of its natural and energy resources,
that the proceeds of development are shared equitably, and, importantly, that
the country is able to project the image of a great power and not of a thirdworld client State. No legal institution can, of itself, solve the crisis of trust
in the Russian politic. Yet, by properly understanding the legal, political,
and cultural factors that have influenced Russia’s development, the country
can craft institutions that take account of these factors, rather than labor
against them. History demonstrates that economic isolation, exploitation of
momentarily successful industry, and alienation of foreign confidence are
not in Russia’s long-term interest.
V.

A PUBLIC LEASING AUTHORITY SEPARATE FROM THE RUSSIAN
GOVERNMENT COULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE STABILITY TO ENCOURAGE
FOREIGN FIRMS TO INVEST IN RUSSIA

In approaching the reform of Russia’s PSA framework, leaders should
look to non-traditional approaches that have been successful in the
management of important public resources in emergent political
environments. On examination, the very problems Russia faces in the
administration of its oil and gas fields have been faced by numerous local
governments in the development and management of their public resources.
Many have chosen to administer those resources by establishing a singlepurpose quasi-governmental authority, a model that Russia should explore.
A.

Public Authorities Successfully Manage Public Resources in Sectors
that Require “Business-Like” Administration

Political insulation of resource managers through the establishment of
a quasi-governmental management authority has historically been effective
in political situations somewhat similar to that currently faced in Russia. For
instance, the cultivation of the dry western United States created disputes
over water, a resource that was indispensable for irrigation and thus for the
economic viability of most rural areas.121 A major problem was that water
120

One Russia observer has commented, “Russia suffers not from too free a market but from
corruption thriving on the excessive regulations erected by a large and pervasive state.” Anders Aslund,
Russia’s Collapse, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 64.
121
JOHN BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1957).
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resources, much like oil and gas, tended to transcend local and regional
administrative districts.122 Lack of cooperation between state and local
entities meant that upstream water resources were often mismanaged, to the
detriment of downstream users.123 For many western states and western
landowners, the solution was the development of special irrigation districts:
local administrative bodies that overlay the existing administrative map and
are managed by professional administrators under the supervision of an
elected or appointed board.124 Beginning in the early 20th Century, many
American states created “Public Authorities,” charged by statute with a
singular purpose, insulated from political influence, subject to suit at law,
and often run by professional administrators.125
Public authorities are now regularly created126 to develop projects
(such as sport stadiums, utilities, or transportation infrastructure) and to
administer public resources (such as ports, public parks, and irrigation).127
At the most basic level, these entities are designed to serve as quasi-public
corporations incorporated for the benefit of the public. They are conceived
with the twin aims of insulating a business-like function from political
manipulation while benefiting from the professional managerial expertise
that many politicians lack.128
Although the public authority owes its existence to the State, it is, in
many cases, freed from the process-oriented requirements of the bureaucracy
and can therefore operate more efficiently.129 It is impossible, and in any
122

Id. at 140.
Id.
124
Id. at 141-49.
125
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, 2D 26-32 (West 2001). Although voluntary
irrigation districts had existed since the late 1800s, the Port Authority of New York is widely recognized as
the first quasi-governmental district in the United States. The Port Authority was created in 1921 by the
States of New York and New Jersey to administer and develop the port.
126
For an example of an early approach to public authorities internationally, see SIDNEY WEBB,
ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Vol. 4, 239-241 (1963). In 1662, the cities of London and Westminster,
England, pioneered such an entity with Parliament’s statutory authorization of “Improvement
Commissioners” to regulate the building of roads and sewers between the two cities as well as to authorize
the removal of interfering structures and provide for “rakers” to clear the roads. In authorizing the
Commissioners, Parliament recognized that the competing parochial interests of the London and
Westminster governments had resulted in the mismanagement of road construction and maintenance, and
that this problem could be addressed by building an entity that could adequately encompass the interests of
both cities.
127
Alternative Financing Mechanisms for Environmental Protection, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Aug. 7, 1992, at 14.
128
See Jameson W. Doig, “If I See a Murderous Fellow Sharpening a Knife Cleverly . . . ”: The
Wilsonian Dichotomy and the Public Authority Tradition, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 43, No. 4
(1983), at 292. (“Many government agencies and their officials have aspired to these twin goals of political
insulation and sophisticated managerial competence, but few have achieved either in a significant
degree.”).
129
See id. at 92-93.
123
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case undesirable, to entirely insulate any public institution from the forces of
politics. The purpose of the public authority is not to supplant either the
state or private enterprise, but rather to complement both, serving as both a
conduit for interaction and a buffer against manipulation.130 The particular
advantage of vesting an economic entrepreneurial enterprise with a quasigovernmental status is that such a body can exercise government-like
functions. Some of these functions include the issuance of public credit, the
exercise of eminent domain, the conference of tax exemptions, and the
creation of monopolies. All of these tasks would be proscribed to ordinary
business entities, but are necessary for the proper administration of a public
resource.131
In terms of political legitimacy, a public authority benefits from the
fact that its constituency (and its level of accountability to that constituency)
can be specifically and strategically prescribed.132 While managers that are
directly elected are likely to be no less independent than other elected
officials from the same district, those appointed by the executive for
extended terms are likely to have a greater degree of political
independence.133 Often, however, the purpose of creating a public authority
is to balance the competing interests of various government entities, such
that the controlling political objectives of each are weighed against the costs
to the others. In irrigation districts, for instance, supervising directors were
typically elected from amongst riparian land owners according to the
number of parcels owned.134 By contrast, authorities for the management of
public housing usually answer to other government entities rather than to the
electorate, and directors are typically appointed by a number of other local
elected officials.135
Importantly, because public authorities are created by the government,
they are often given policy as well as economic mandates.136 The State of
130
Gerald Fetner, Public Power and Professional Responsibility: Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins
of the Public Authority, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1977) at 22-24. A
key characteristic of the special district is that it can be legislatively required to undertake endeavors or
projects that are either so risky or so unprofitable that private enterprise would be unwilling to do the same.
By publicly absorbing this risk, the special district can, in effect, manufacture a stable or healthy market
situation, creating space for private industry to engage in profitable management or administration of public
resources. At the same time, the special district can fulfill a regulatory role, answering to a public mandate
to provide services required or desired by the state. Id.
131
ROBERT G. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 91
(1964).
132
See BOLLENS, supra note 121, at 142.
133
Doig, supra note 128, at 297.
134
Id. at 146.
135
Id. at 31.
136
For the implications of these split mandates, see SMITH, supra note 131, at 56-57.
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Washington, like other states, vests public irrigation districts with the split
purposes of stewarding watersheds, leasing water rights, and managing
hydroelectric public utilities.137 These are diverse and often countervailing
purposes which the district directors are empowered to weigh and balance
independent of State or local interference.
B.

The Many Benefits of Non-Governmental Administration Could Add
Predictability, Efficiency, and Transparency to Russia’s Oil and Gas
Sectors

While never before used on such a scale, the public authority structure
could plausibly be adapted to the administration of exploration and
development of Russian oil and gas. To accomplish the goal of investment
stability, the management of energy concessions must be removed from the
direct control of the legislature and the executive. While the state Duma and
the President should be involved in setting general policy for energy
exploration, the granting and regulation of specific concessions should be
vested in an independent quasi-governmental Public Leasing Authority
(“PLA”). That authority, governed by an independent board of directors,
would be competent to administer energy concessions within a designated
geographic region of Russia.
The PLA should be authorized under federal legislation for the split
purposes of administering a geographically-defined oil or gas interest;
granting concessions to foreign and domestic companies for exploration and
development; setting environmental, health, and safety regulations not lower
than those established in Federal law at the time that the concession is
granted;138 interpreting and applying those regulations; and granting all
necessary permits and authorizations within the defined area related to the
project. As part of the arrangement, the Russian Federation would lease the
mineral resources within the defined area to the PLA in exchange for royalty
payments calculated to include all revenues not necessary for the
administration of the PLA, including PLA-sponsored exploration and
137

See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 87.84.005 (1963), 87.03.013 (1979), 87.03.010 (1923).
The importance of setting a baseline of social regulation below which oil and gas concessions
cannot fall is obvious: because the externalities of oil and gas development (including environmental costs,
resettlement of populations, and public safety) have the greatest impact on the Russian people as a whole,
their elected representatives must have a role in defining the minimum standards in each area. Yet, because
Russian politicians have demonstrated that they are willing to use such regulation to accomplish political
goals, the minimum standards must remain stable throughout the life of the concession. At the same time,
recognizing that changes in technology and international standards may precipitate a need to make those
standards more stringent, the board of the PLA, insulated from countervailing incentives, must be
empowered to make regulatory changes.
138
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development costs. By creating such an entity, the Russian government
would create a political “buffer” between the state and the international
investor, ameliorating many of the causes of instability in the current regime.
While removal of public resource administration from the elected
organs of government may raise republican ire, a government’s goals can
sometimes best be accomplished with recognition that elected leaders are not
themselves best qualified for dispassionate administration. Even in the
ostensibly most democratic societies, the leasing of subsoil resources has
traditionally been removed from politically-sensitive institutions, in
recognition of the opportunity for political manipulation and favoritism in
the granting of development rights.139 By delegating administration of
leases to administrative agencies, these countries separate the “policy”
aspect of leasing (which is retained by the legislature) from the
“administrative” aspect, which is delegated to a disinterested third party.
While the United States and Britain allow leasing decisions to be
made by executive departments, they are also countries with long and
established histories of separating the ministerial and political functions of
those departments.140 Russia, by contrast, has no such history.141 It is
therefore unrealistic to suggest that the Russian bureaucracy should act like
its American or British counterparts. Political manipulation is a fact of
139
Indeed, in much of the world it has been recognized that traditionally democratic institutions may
not be best suited for the management of commercial enterprises. In an 1887 article, Woodrow Wilson
aptly summarized the propriety of borrowing commercial and monarchic structures for republican public
purposes: “If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the
knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed
in the wool managing a public business well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my
republican spots.” Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. II
No. 2 (June 1887) 197, 220. In the United States, management of outer-continental shelf oil leases (those
outside of the jurisdiction of the states) is vested in the Secretary of the Interior. See Outer-Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Similarly in the United Kingdom, leasing of North Sea oil reserves
is controlled by the Department of Trade and Industry under a delegation from the Secretary of State.
Christopher F. Richardson, The Influence of Offshore Leasing Regimes on Commercial Oil Activity: An
Empirical Analysis of Property Rights in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, 17 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L.
REV. 97, 105 (2004).
140
See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, (1765 KB) 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 708 (holding the Earl of
Halifax amenable to suit at common law for illegal issuance of a warrant, and explaining the distinction
between
ministerial and
discretionary functions
of
public
officials),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/trials/entick/entick_v_carrington.htm; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. 738, 839-846 (1824) (recognizing the authority of the federal courts to issue injunctions against state
ministers when their actions are or threaten to be in contravention of federal law).
141
Under both the Tsar and the Soviet Union, government ministers acted subject to either the
direction of executive authority or their own self-interests, often giving little thought to whether their
actions comported with established legislative policy or the statutory functions of their offices. See
Anastasia Nesvetailova, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Sussex, Putin and the Return of
Empire? Reconstituting Russia’s Political Economy after Crisis (Apr. 18-20, 2001) (unpublished article, on
file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, quoted with permission of the author).
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Russian bureaucratic administration. The only way to separate resource
administration from the political equation is to separate it entirely from the
Government.
C.

A Successful PLA Must Be Both Politically Responsive and
Economically Responsible to Capture Domestic Political Legitimacy
and Attract Foreign Investment

In order to meet its split mandates of profitably developing energy
resources while safeguarding the environment, workers, and communities,
the PLA must manifest 3 important features: 1) it must be self-contained,142
solely empowered to grant energy concessions, administer all attendant
matters within its realm, and authorized to make findings of fact subject to
judicial deference; 2) it must be truly independent, governed by directors
appointed by multiple government levels for extended fixed terms,143 and 3)
it must be subject to suit and authorized to bring suit in a designated court of
international arbitration, the decisions of which must be made enforceable in
Russia notwithstanding incongruence with domestic public policy.
1.

A Self-Contained Entity Will Be Less Susceptible To Outside Political
Pressures

The primary rationale for encapsulating oil and gas concessions
within the authority of a single quasi-governmental body is the same as that
for which developing countries around the world look to PSAs: stability and
predictability. Namely, ordinary PSAs are self-contained agreements
governing all aspects of the development relationship, and providing
predictability for foreign investors who rely upon explicitly defined future
rights and obligations. In the Russian context, however, companies invested
through PSAs remain dependent on the Russian government and various
departments within the bureaucracy for permits, financial authorizations, and
development permissions. These disparate parts of the bureaucracy are less
concerned with profitable development, future investment, and sustainable
management than they are with elevating their own influence. Like an
142
The reader will recall that a “self-contained” entity was a principle rationale behind the adoption
of the PSA framework to begin with. See Stoleson, supra note 18, at 672. This principle is particularly
important in the context of an otherwise unstable political environment, but was never fully realized in the
Russian context. Through removal from Government control, the Public Leasing Authority is likely to be
more successful in achieving this goal.
143
For a perspective on the importance of independent directors, and their relative scarcity in the
context of public authorities, see Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public
Authority Administration Lead to Democracy?, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851, 891-92 (2006).
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irrigation district or port authority, a PLA would be a forum for
consideration of all interests. It would balance the desire for current profit
and production against the future interest in sustainable and sociallyresponsible development. Perhaps most importantly, the PLA would provide
a single entity with which the international investor could interact, allowing
for the development of relationships and understandings to transcend the
political immediacies of the day.
2.

Independence from the Central Government Will Diminish the
Likelihood that Oil and Gas Contracts Will Be Used to Accomplish
Unrelated Political Objectives

In Russia, government involvement in a private enterprise has become
synonymous with executive control.144 Where the government has gained a
controlling share in domestic corporations, it has used that stake to filter
Government policy through entities that have become private in name only.
Because of this track record, it is important, for both appearances and
function, that the directors of the PLA have the freedom to act independently
of the Russian government. Yet, those chosen to administer the industry
supporting Russia’s fragile economy must be charged to act in the country’s
long-term interest. Leadership must be both insulated from and responsive
to political pressures. This seemingly oxymoronic end can be met, to a
degree, by providing for the appointment of PLA directors by the national,
regional, and local governments for extended fixed terms.
Creating an independent entity to administer oil and gas leasing
presents an opportunity for the development of political legitimacy through
federalism. Russia is a federation of 88 regional governments, including 3
autonomous republics.145 Given the widespread environmental, public
health, and labor implications of immense infrastructure investments, it is
important from a democratic perspective that local voices be represented.
Popular accedance can be enhanced and regionalism overcome by reversing
the centralization of the 1998 PSA legislation amendments and designating
director positions to be appointed by the regional and local governments in
the effected areas.
144
PETER BAKER AND SUSAN GLASSER, KREMLIN RISING 125 (2005). One should also note that there
are few examples, either contemporary or historical, of a truly independent institution in Russia,
particularly in the government sector. President Putin’s efforts of the last several years, aimed at
consolidating and centralizing government power and influence, have further diminished the likelihood of
the emergence of such an institution. This Comment does not, therefore, purport to suggest what is likely
to occur organically, but rather posits a suggestion for what may work if prudently adopted.
145
CIA World Factbook: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007).
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For too long, the regulators of the energy sector have been beholden to
the central government and to their own conflicting interests. Independence,
to the extent achievable, must be premised on freedom to make decisions
counter to the political and economic expediencies of the short term without
economic or political conflicts of interest.
3.

In the Wake of Sakhalin II, International Investors Will Demand
Robust Enforcement Mechanisms

Ultimately, any structural solution is meaningless without a significant
mechanism for enforcement. One of the primary obstacles to foreign
investment in Russia’s energy sector is the lack of recourse in the event of
contractual breach. Foreign investors’ fears are likely to be exacerbated by
the heavy-handed way in which the Russian government has dealt with
regulation of the Sakhalin II project. As Mikhail Khodorokovsky’s
generation has shown itself to be both financially and politically savvy, and
because the Russian courts have shown themselves to be unable to enforce
judgments to a meaningful degree,146 a new and sophisticated mechanism of
enforcement must be crafted to meet international standards and demands.
In developing an effective enforcement mechanism, Russia should
take advantage of the increasing credibility and gravitas of international
arbitration. Allowing international arbitration as the dispute resolution
tribunal of first instance for disputes arising between the PLA and the
foreign investor has several significant advantages over relying on domestic
enforcement. First, it provides a strong mechanism for Russian enforcement
against the foreign investor. Because the international arbitrator’s award is
more likely than a domestic Russian award to be enforced in the foreign
jurisdiction where the oil or gas company is incorporated,147 the foreign
investor is more likely to be responsive to arbitrator’s decisions. 148 Second,
because the PLA will inevitably be engaged in international commerce,
resort to international arbitration provides a significant means of
enforcement even if an award cannot be recovered against the PLA’s assets
146
According to information provided by Russia’s Ministry of Justice, fewer than half of Russia’s
domestic court judgments are enforced. Burger, supra note 67, at 91.
147
See generally Alla Naglis, The Status of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration in Russia, in A
LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA AND THE FORMER U.S.S.R. 110, 120 (Aviva Yakren, ed.
2000) (discussing the enforceability of international arbitration awards in Russia and abroad).
148
Currently, 141 nations are signatories to the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. See UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW, STATUS: 1958 – CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ NYConvention_
status.html.
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in Russia. With an arbitrator’s award in hand, an aggrieved party is more
likely to be able to attach the PLA’s foreign assets, as well as to garnish
revenue generated by other foreign investors before it is paid to the Russian
party.149 Finally, international arbitration in a mutually agreeable forum will
provide necessary external oversight and bring a level of transparency to the
agreements that is not present in the current system.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Russia is at a turning point no less significant than that which it faced
in 1991. As the world marches toward a borderless international free trade
zone, Russia is deciding just what type of power it wishes to be. The energy
sector, while admittedly unique in many ways, provides insight into the
future development of Russia’s foreign investment prospects. In the near
term, Russia will not be a model of American or European liberal
democracy. Similarly, its oil and gas industry should not be expected to
organically follow the relatively laissez-faire model of the West. The blatant
and highly-public expropriation of the Sakhalin II project is likely to make
this realization clear to international observers.
One way to expose the Russian public to a transparent, responsible,
and predictable political institution is to create one in Russia’s most
important economic sector. At the same time, the temptation for Russian
politicians eager to manipulate the energy sector may simply be too great.
For the same reasons that make energy an obvious test-bed for the
development of responsible institutions, the sector is prone to political
manipulation by those seeking to capitalize on Russia’s new-found
prosperity. By demonstrating that it is willing to expropriate successful
projects, even high profile projects, without significant compensation, the
Russian Government has essentially indicated that private investment in
Russia is not secure. This threatens to undermine Russia’s efforts to attract
the foreign expertise that it still needs to modernize its economy, and
threatens to destabilize Russia’s efforts to join the international marketplace,
including the World Trade Organization.

149
For a foreign perspective on recovering international arbitration awards that are not recognized by
Russian law, see Jeffrey M. Hertzfeld, Russian Corporate Governance: The Foreign Direct Investor’s
Perspective, presented at the Conference on Corporate Governance in Russia, sponsored by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, United States Agency for International
Development, and World Bank 7, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/47/1921803.pdf (even
when the Russian courts will not recognize an arbitrator’s award, it is possible to recover a judgment
against foreign assets located in a country that will recognize it).
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Establishment of a Public Leasing Authority could be an essential
component of Russia’s new approach to energy administration. Removed
from the volatile Middle East, a major economic player, and the world’s
leading exporter of energy, Russia is in a unique position to be a world
leader in attracting foreign investment. With that investment could come
infrastructure
improvement,
economic
diversification,
greater
industrialization in the Far East, and, ultimately, greater political stability.
Yet, to realize this promise, Russia must set aside its traditional skepticism
of foreign investment and engage the world marketplace on international
terms. By establishing a mechanism to professionally and independently
manage Russia’s energy resources, the country would signal to the world
that it is finally serious about developing a predictable and stable legal
environment for regulating its most essential industry.

